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Abstract 
 
This article argues that the rules of European private international law, which frame 
international litigation in the courts of the Member States of the EU, fail in their pursuit of 
the cosmopolitan goals of EU environmental policy.  The practical application of these rules 
is limited to the following two types of case: 1) the case of victims suing an operator whose 
actions in one country directly cause environmental damage elsewhere, and 2) the case of 
victims suing a European-based multinational corporation operating in an extraction or 
chemical industry whose overseas subsidiary, typically in a developing country, causes 
environmental damage.  By arguably not accommodating claims by public authorities against 
foreign operators, including from other Member States, which are crucial in cases of pure 
environmental damage, and the cases of the second type in industries other than extraction 
and chemical, European private international law fails to achieve fully its regulatory 
potential.  Furthermore, the rules of European private international law have the effect of 
raising the level of environmental protection solely within the EU and at its borders in the 
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first type of case and shielding European multinational corporations from liability for the 
environmentally detrimental and degrading effects of their overseas operations in the second 
type of case.  These rules are therefore an inadequate tool of global governance.  Avenues for 
improving the law are mentioned. 
Keywords: environment; litigation; European Union; private international law; conflict of 
laws; jurisdiction; choice of law 
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Introduction 
In the early 1990s, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People protested in Nigeria 
against the environmental damage caused by Royal Dutch Shell’s oil operations in 
Ogoniland, in the Niger Delta.  Several protesters were arrested by the Nigerian armed forces, 
charged with questionable crimes and executed.  Amongst them was Dr Barinem Kiobel, 
whose widow, after obtaining asylum in the United States, together with a number of other 
former Ogoniland residents, brought a class action suit under the 1789 Alien Tort Claims Act 
(‘ATCA’).1  The Act provides that ‘[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty 
of the United States’.  The claimants argued that the Anglo-Dutch corporation and its 
Nigerian subsidiary were complicit in the Nigerian government’s violations of the law of 
nations, including extrajudicial killing, torture, rape, arbitrary arrest and detention, theft and 
destruction of property. 
In April 2013, after a protracted legal battle, the US Supreme Court decided 
unanimously in favour of the defendants.
2
  The majority noted a strong presumption against 
the extraterritorial application of US law, and held that the Act did not cover overseas 
conduct of multinational corporations.  According to Roberts CJ, who delivered the opinion 
of the Court, the presumption will be displaced ‘where the claims touch and concern the 
territory of the United States…with sufficient force…  [I]t would reach too far to say that 
mere corporate presence suffices.’3  Alito J went further in his concurring opinion, in which 
Thomas J joined, by holding that an ATCA claim would fail, ‘unless the domestic conduct is 
sufficient to violate an international law norm that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of 
                                                 
1
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 Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 113 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
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definitiveness and acceptance among civilised nations’,4 a very high threshold indeed.  
Although the exact impact of Kiobel is unclear,
5
 it is evident that in the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation the Act has a very narrow reach. 
A reference to a US case concerning international human rights litigation may seem 
like a strange way to open an article dealing with international environmental litigation in the 
courts of the Member States of the European Union.  But Kiobel is an important piece of the 
context in which international environmental litigation now takes place in Europe.  It also 
illustrates two important characteristics of this type of litigation.  First, environmental 
litigation is often not just about who ultimately bears the risk of environmentally detrimental 
and degrading economic activities.  It is often also, sometimes primarily, about the victims’ 
human rights, usually the right to life, private and family life and home,
6
 health, property and 
the like, sometimes even about human rights not typically perceived as closely related to the 
protection of the environment (e.g. the right to a fair trial).  Second, international 
environmental litigation typically involves claimants from a developing country who suffer 
damage as a result of the local activities of a multinational corporation and its local 
subsidiary.
7
  In the past few decades, numerous cases with these characteristics have been 
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brought in US courts under the ATCA.
8
  The Act has had a positive impact in the form of 
increased public awareness of the relevant issues, settlement of disputes and the resulting 
compensation of victims and even environmental remediation, and multinational corporations 
taking human rights and the protection of the environment more seriously.  Now that the US 
Supreme Court has interpreted very narrowly the Act’s reach, effectively barring victims of 
gross violations of human rights and the environment outside the US by multinational 
corporations from bringing ATCA claims, such victims will have to turn to other forums for 
the vindication of their rights.
9
  European countries, where many multinational corporations 
originate, and particularly England, are promising alternative venues. 
This article explores whether and how the rules of private international law of EU 
law, which frame international litigation in the Member State courts, contribute to the 
regulation of the environment.  Looking from another perspective, this article examines 
whether international environmental litigation in Europe, and thereby the relevant rules of 
European private international law, are an adequate tool of global governance.  Given the 
close connection between environmental and human rights litigation, the discussion in this 
article is also relevant for the debate concerning the role of international litigation for the 
protection of human rights. 
In the EU, transnational environmental cases have been brought primarily in England, 
and to a significantly lesser extent in a few other Member States, most notably the 
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Netherlands.  Since many relevant issues have been discussed and decided by the English 
courts, this article will focus on international environmental litigation in this country.  There 
are two additional reasons for such focus.  First, the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Chandler v Cape Plc,
10
 in which a duty of care was imposed on the defendant parent 
company for the health and safety of the employees of its dissolved subsidiary, might 
encourage overseas victims to bring claims in England against English-based multinational 
corporations for damage caused by their overseas subsidiaries to the local workers and 
general population.  Second, the English legal system is said to offer claimants a number of 
procedural advantages, not all of which are available in other Member States: a system of 
conditional fees coupled with litigation insurance against the risk of having to pay the other 
party’s legal costs; efficient, skilled and impartial judges; availability of group actions; rules 
on disclosure and the preservation and taking of evidence; potentially high damages etc.
11
  A 
disproportionate number of transnational environmental cases is therefore likely to continue 
to be litigated in England in comparison with other Member States. 
The relevant rules of European private international law are contained in two EU law 
instruments.  The first is the Recast of the Brussels I Regulation,
12
 which replaced as of 10 
January 2015 the Brussels I Regulation.
13
  It allocates adjudicatory jurisdiction among the 
Member State courts and enables the free movement of judgments within Europe in civil and 
commercial matters.  The second is the Rome II Regulation,
14
 which lays down choice-of-law 
rules for non-contractual obligations.  Rome II contains special rules for environmental 
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damage in Article 7, which are largely inspired by the case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (‘CJEU’) on jurisdiction for environmental torts under the Brussels 
jurisdictional regime.
15
  In a nutshell, the law applicable to environmental damage is by 
default the law of the country of the damage, but the victim can choose the law of the country 
of the event giving rise to the damage.  Similarly, the victim can commence proceedings, in 
addition to the Member State of the defendant’s domicile, in either the Member State of the 
damage or the Member State of the event. 
Recital 25 in the Preamble to Rome II states expressly that the special choice-of-law 
rules are justified by Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
16
 
which concerns EU environmental policy.  These special choice-of-law rules also implement 
Article 3(3) and (5) of the Treaty on European Union,
17
 which sets the achievement of 
‘sustainable development’ and ‘a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of 
the environment’ as core objectives of the EU.  EU environmental policy includes the 
apparently cosmopolitan goals of ‘preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the 
environment, protecting human health, prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources, 
and promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide 
environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change’.18  The term 
‘cosmopolitan’ is used here to denote a normative standpoint that considers and 
accommodates the interests and values of individuals and communities not just within but 
also outside the EU.
19
  In the same vein, EU environmental policy aims ‘at a high level of 
protection’ and is based on the following universally accepted principles of environmental 
law: ‘precautionary principle and...the principles that preventive action should be taken, that 
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environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should 
pay’.20  Since many environmental problems are transnational, even global, in nature, it is 
logical that the relevant rules of European private international law, which may assist in their 
solution, should take a cosmopolitan approach.  Indeed, many influential private international 
law scholars are of the opinion that Article 7 of Rome II pursues, and in an adequate manner, 
the cosmopolitan goals of EU environmental policy.
21
  This rule has also been endorsed by 
the Hague Conference on Private International Law and the International Law Association.
22
 
Contrary to the majority opinion, this article argues that the relevant rules of European 
private international law fail to take a cosmopolitan approach.  They are therefore an 
inadequate tool of global governance.  There is a good argument that the Brussels I Recast 
and Rome II exclude from their scope claims by public authorities against foreign operators 
and the resulting judgments, thus hindering an important type of international environmental 
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litigation, which is crucial in cases of pure environmental damage, from taking place in 
Europe.  The two Regulations address relatively adequately the type of case where the claim 
is brought by victims against an operator whose actions in one country directly cause 
environmental damage elsewhere.  But the cases of this type that are brought in EU courts 
will almost always concern actions committed in the EU and/or environmental damage 
suffered in the EU.  The rules of the Brussels I Recast and Rome II concerning this type of 
case therefore help to raise the level of environmental protection within the EU and at its 
borders, but not elsewhere.  Crucially, there is a good argument that European private 
international law fails to deal with the globally more important and frequent cases of the 
same type as Kiobel.  It effectively shields European multinational corporations from liability 
for the environmentally detrimental and degrading effects of their overseas operations.  For 
these reasons, the relevant rules of European private international law overall fail in their 
pursuit of the cosmopolitan goals of EU environmental policy.  This conclusion raises the 
question of how European private international law can achieve fully its regulatory potential. 
This article is divided into seven sections.  Following this introduction, the second 
section outlines the regulatory potential of private international law with regard to the 
protection of the environment.  The third section divides the relevant CJEU and English cases 
into different types.  It demonstrates that whatever regulatory potential European private 
international law may have, its practical application is limited to only two types of case, 
namely the case of victims suing an operator whose actions in one country directly cause 
environmental damage elsewhere and the cases of the same type as Kiobel, but the latter only 
with regard to extraction and chemical industries.  The reasons for the relatively limited 
practical application of the relevant rules of European private international law are provided.  
The subsequent three sections explore how the rules of jurisdiction of the Brussels I Recast 
and the special choice-of-law rules for environmental damage of Rome II apply to the two 
10 
 
types of case identified in the third section.  Shortcomings in the current rules are identified.  
The seventh section concludes and examines the avenues for improvement. 
 
Private international law and the regulation of the environment 
It is nowadays widely understood that private law can be used as a regulatory tool that 
supplements or even replaces the ‘command and control’ and other types of regulation.  
Private international law, a field of law of particular relevance for international 
environmental litigation, is no exception.
23
  This section presents the regulatory challenges 
posed by transnational environmental cases and various regulatory responses to them.
24
  The 
aim is to disclose the regulatory potential of private international law in this context. 
International environmental litigation concerns cases of environmental damage that 
are connected with more than one country.  In some cases, an operator’s actions in country A 
directly cause environmental damage in country B.  The main challenge in this type of case is 
that, since environmental standards
25
 of countries differ, the operator will be subject to the 
exclusive application of the laxer standards of country A, even if the negative externalities of 
its activities are suffered in country B.  In other cases, as illustrated by Kiobel, a parent 
company from country A has a subsidiary in country B that causes environmental damage in 
the latter country.  In this type of case, regulatory challenges are created by the fact that a 
multinational corporation, composed of the parent and its subsidiaries, operates its many parts 
                                                 
23
 For the regulatory function of private international law see R. Michaels, ‘New European Choice-of-Law 
Revolution’ (2008) 82 Tulane Law Review 1607; H. Muir Watt, ‘Choice of Law in Integrated and 
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25
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in more than one country ‘with the coherence of intent and implementation that resembles a 
single entity’.26  Of course, the constituent parts of a multinational corporation can be 
connected into a single economic entity not just through bonds of ownership but also through 
contractual relations or even informal alliances.
27
  The constituent parts, however, remain 
separate legal persons, falling under distinct and independent regulatory systems of the 
countries in which they are established and operate.  Consequently, each legal person forming 
part of a multinational corporation is accountable, in principle, only to its local authorities 
and liable only to its own creditors.  The main challenge in this type of case is that, through 
smart corporate organisation, the multinational corporation, as a single economic entity, may 
reap the profits generated by its constituent parts and simultaneously shift the risk of negative 
externalities of their activities on third parties by taking advantage of the constituent parts’ 
separate legal personality, their limited liability, the territorial jurisdiction of local authorities, 
and regulatory failures in host countries.  These failures consist in the inability or 
unwillingness of local authorities to regulate and oversee the multinational corporation’s 
local activities because of the host country’s socio-economic underdevelopment, low 
administrative capacity and technical expertise, information asymmetry, fear of driving away 
foreign investors, corruption, collusion with the corporation and the like.
28
  These failures are 
often caused or exacerbated by a great disparity in economic power between the 
multinational corporation and its home country, on the one hand, and the host country, on the 
other.
29
  Under-regulation may therefore occur in both types of case, leading to a globally 
suboptimal allocation of resources. 
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 M. Anderson, ‘Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage: Is Tort Law the Answer?’ (2002) 41 
Washburn Law Journal 399, 402. 
27
 See G. Teubner, Networks as Connected Contracts (Oxford: Hart, 2011), edited with an introduction by H. 
Collins. 
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In setting, monitoring and enforcing environmental standards, countries are typically 
guided by the interests and values of local individuals and communities, without considering 
and accommodating the interests and values of outsiders.  This results in two additional 
regulatory challenges.
30
  First, countries may turn the problem of under-regulation into an 
opportunity, and compete to attract foreign direct investment and try to increase the 
competitiveness of domestic businesses by lowering their environmental standards, especially 
when the negative externalities of local activities are suffered across the border.  This 
‘regulatory competition’ may, in turn, lead to a ‘race to the bottom’.  An extreme example of 
this is Papua New Guinea where lax environmental standards were coupled with legislation 
making it a criminal offence to sue multinational mining corporations operating and causing 
damage in that country.
31
  Yet another challenge is that countries typically regulate activities 
taking place in, or affecting, their territory without regard to the regulation in other countries.  
Consequently, operators may be subject to environmental standards of more than country, 
which may result in over-regulation.  Both scenarios lead to a globally inefficient resources 
allocation. 
These regulatory challenges would not exist if there were a global standard-setting, 
monitoring and enforcing authority or an effective global system of cooperation of national 
authorities with regard to the protection of the environment.  But there is no such authority or 
system.  Environmental treaties are patchy
32
 because of a genuine disagreement over the 
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content and method of monitoring and enforcement of international environmental standards, 
and because of the free-riding by countries that see the advantage of not respecting such 
standards when other countries do.
33
  Furthermore, the existing treaties usually do not impose 
obligations directly upon multinational corporations and other operators.  Some scholars have 
advanced the idea that the home country of a multinational corporation should be responsible 
under international law, at least in some cases, for the environmental damage caused by the 
corporation’s constituent parts.34  This idea, however, remains purely theoretical.  There are 
many ‘soft law’ instruments regulating the activities of multinational corporations.  
Particularly prominent are the following codes of conduct: the United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights,
35
 Global Compact,
36
 Agenda 21,
37
 the 
International Labour Organisation Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy,
38
 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,
39
 and the ISO 26000 Guidance 
Standard on Social Responsibility.
40
  In addition, there is consumer pressure through eco-
labelling, investor pressure through environment-friendly investment practices, general public 
and civil society pressure, and corporate self-regulation.  But since these regulatory responses 
typically do not result in the imposition of legal obligations on multinational corporations and 
other operators, their regulatory potential is limited. 
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Another response to the regulatory challenges posed by transnational environmental 
cases lies in international environmental litigation.  In purely domestic settings, tort law is 
used as a regulatory tool for the protection of the environment, usually as a supplement to 
‘command and control’ and other types of regulation.41  It pursues the objective of 
compensating victims of environmental damage for the harm they suffer as a consequence of 
the tortfeasor’s actions, possibly also making funds available for environmental remediation.  
The compensatory function of tort law is usually supported by liability insurance or 
environmental damage insurance.  Furthermore, by forcing actual or potential tortfeasors to 
internalise the negative externalities of their activities, tort law also performs a specific and 
general deterring function.  The tortfeasor is in a better position to bear the risk of its 
activities than those who are affected by them.  For instance, it can improve its environmental 
performance by investing in its technologies and practices and take out insurance.  On the 
other hand, it is highly unlikely that many victims of the tortfeasor’s activities will have 
known of, insured themselves against or in other way managed the risk of those activities.  
By shifting the risk to the best cost-avoider, tort law contributes to the achievement of the 
optimal allocation of resources.  Where environmental damage is caused by a member of a 
corporate group, the fulfilment of tort law’s regulatory function also depends on whether, and 
to what extent, company law ascribes to the parent company liability for the environmental 
damage caused by its subsidiary.  In transnational cases, the applicable tort law and company 
law depend on the applicable choice-of-law rules, which, in turn, depend on where the 
litigation takes place.  By allowing the victim to commence proceedings in a certain 
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jurisdiction and by leading to the application of a certain law, private international law also 
performs compensatory and deterring functions.  International environmental litigation has 
other characteristics which support its regulatory function: it generates pressure on private 
actors and governments; it constitutes, sustains and energises transnational networks of civil 
society; it provides information and policy opinions to interested parties, transnational 
networks and broader publics; it encourages settlement.
42
  The fact that international 
environmental litigation relies on private parties to bring claims with a regulatory impact 
contributes to the effectiveness of this regulatory response.  In some countries, conditional or 
contingent fees are available.  There, the victim may obtain the services of top litigation 
lawyers who will also have an interest in the outcome of the litigation. 
International environmental litigation, however, comes with a number of 
disadvantages.  It can be slow, expensive, and operates on an ex post and case-by-case, and 
therefore selective and unsystematic, basis.  There may be factual and legal problems arising 
out of the long latency of harm, the indeterminate nature of claimants and defendants, and the 
intersection of public law and civil liability.
43
  In criticising the use of tort law as a regulatory 
tool, Cane notes that courts are neither expert in relevant areas of regulated activity nor 
politically responsive, that they rely more or less exclusively on litigants for information 
about regulated activities, and that court procedures in tort cases largely exclude participation 
of third parties who might be affected by the regulated activity.
44
  In addition, tort litigation 
sometimes exhibits the following negative features: ‘inexperienced and under-funded lawyers 
representing poor and vulnerable clients against wealthy and aggressively defensive 
corporations; the difficulty courts have in dealing with scientific uncertainty; and the negative 
                                                 
42
 R. Wai, ‘Transnational Private Litigation and Transnational Governance’ in M. Lederer and P.S. Mueller 
(eds), Criticising Global Governance (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 243, 248-250. 
43
 Abraham, above, n 41, 380-383. 
44
 Cane, ‘Tort Law as Regulation’, above, n 41, 313. 
16 
 
effects of delay and inequality of bargaining power on settlement negotiations’.45  Some of 
these disadvantages can be mitigated to a large extent by improving civil procedure rules or 
introducing specialised environmental courts and tribunals.
46
  On the other hand, political 
irresponsiveness of the judiciary, seen by Cane as a disadvantage in purely domestic settings, 
can actually represent an advantage in transnational environmental cases.  In cases like 
Kiobel, for example, overseas victims of the activities of a multinational corporation resort to 
litigation in the home country of the multinational’s parent company because they are unable 
to obtain justice in their own country.  Since such victims are outsiders in the forum country, 
their interests will be unrepresented in the legislative and administrative bodies of that 
country.  International environmental litigation, however, provides for a more open and 
effective point of access for such victims.
47
  Since judges are independent of the directly 
accountable legislatures and executives and hold permanent positions, they are less likely to 
succumb to the pressure to resolve transnational environmental cases exclusively in the 
interest of local individuals and communities. 
Given the lack of comprehensive and effective international environmental standards 
and a global system of cooperation, and the limitations of alternative regulatory responses, 
international environmental litigation is a promising way of addressing the regulatory 
challenges posed by transnational environmental cases despite all its disadvantages.
48
  In 
order to achieve fully its regulatory potential, private international law should lead to 
outcomes that avoid both under- and over-regulation.  Private international law can attain this 
goal only if the rules of adjudicatory jurisdiction and choice of law result in a coordinated 
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allocation of adjudicatory and regulatory authority.
49
  Such coordination inevitably requires 
the rules of private international law to take a cosmopolitan approach.  But a crucial question 
then arises.  If comprehensive and effective international environmental standards and a 
global system of cooperation cannot be achieved because countries are typically guided by 
the interests and values of local individuals and communities, why would any country adopt 
private international law rules that take into account and accommodate the interests and 
values of outsiders? 
The rules of private international law concerning the environment in general, and 
particularly those of EU law, should take a cosmopolitan approach for the following reasons.  
Since environmental problems are transnational, even global, in nature, they require 
cosmopolitan solutions.
50
  The fact that truly global solutions are precluded because of 
genuine disagreement among countries and the problem of free-riding shows that the 
objective of environmental protection can more adequately be pursued at a sub-global level, 
for example through rules of private international law in conjunction with the applicable tort 
and company laws.  The EU is particularly well suited for providing cosmopolitan private 
international law rules.
51
  The EU pursues objectives that transcend the interests and values of 
individual Member States and, furthermore, prides itself with the highest standards in many 
policy areas.  It is therefore not surprising that EU environmental policy expressly pursues 
cosmopolitan goals.
52
  Europe is a home to many multinational corporations and other 
operators engaged in environmentally detrimental and degrading activities.  The EU therefore 
has the power to affect the way such activities are conducted and thereby neutralise the 
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effects of the measures adopted by host countries that lead to the ‘race to the bottom’, thus 
raising the global level of environmental protection.  As a beneficiary of such activities, the 
EU should be responsible for their regulation, especially where there are regulatory failures in 
host countries.
53
  This is indeed required by many EU citizens, who act as consumers and 
small investors.  Requiring multinational corporations established in the EU to respect high 
environmental standards also makes a long-term economic sense.
54
  For example, in order to 
reduce their compliance costs, those corporations will have to invest in research and 
development.  Since there is a global trend of raising environmental standards, such 
investment may pay off in the long term.  Those corporations may be able to export advanced 
environmental technologies and practices, on the one hand, and enjoy greater productivity 
levels in comparison with their foreign competitors, on the other.
55
  The argument that home 
state regulation represents an imperialist infringement of the sovereignty of disempowered 
host states is not persuasive where the interests at stake, i.e. the protection of the 
environment, are truly global.
56
 
If the rules of private international law do take a cosmopolitan approach, this field of 
law will have gone a long way towards adopting a ‘planetary perspective’57 and fulfilling its 
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‘social mission’.58  The examination of whether, and to what extent, European private 
international law achieves its regulatory potential starts with the exploration of the types of 
transnational environmental cases it is able to accommodate. 
 
Types of transnational environmental cases and international environmental litigation 
in EU courts 
International environmental litigation is not a new phenomenon in Europe.  Two relevant 
cases have thus far been decided by the CJEU.  The English courts have been particularly 
busy with this kind of litigation.  A very important case has recently been brought in the 
Dutch courts.  By focusing on the two CJEU cases and the experience of the English and 
Dutch courts in the past two decades, this section aims to identify the types of transnational 
environmental case that are litigated in Europe, and to explain why some types of case do not 
appear in EU courts. 
 
(1) Types of case litigated in EU courts 
The two cases decided by the CJEU are Bier
59
 and Land Oberösterreich v ČEZ.60  In Bier, a 
Dutch horticulturalist and the Reinwater Foundation, a non-governmental environmental 
organisation that aims to improve the quality of the water in the Rhine basin, brought an 
action in the Netherlands against a French potash mining company.  The defendant had 
polluted the waters of the Rhine by discharging in it saline waste from its operations.  The 
first claimant suffered damage as a result of using the polluted water for irrigation.  The issue 
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before the Court was whether the Dutch courts had jurisdiction under the Brussels 
Convention,
61
 the predecessor of the Brussels I Regulation and the Brussels I Recast.  In 
Land Oberösterreich v ČEZ, Land Oberösterreich, an Austrian local authority, and some 
private persons commenced proceedings in nuisance against ČEZ, a Czech public utility 
company, seeking injunctive relief.  The defendant operates a nuclear power plant in 
Temelin, a place in the Czech Republic near the Austrian border.  The claimants alleged that 
the power plant emitted ionising radiation, which affected their agricultural land located in 
Austria.  The issue was whether EU law obliged the claimants to tolerate the activities of the 
defendant which had been authorised by the Czech authorities in situation where an 
equivalent authorisation by the Austrian authorities to an operator of a nuclear power plant in 
Austria would have precluded claims for injunctive relief. 
Cases of international environmental litigation in the English courts are fairly 
numerous.  They concerned the pollution of water, land and air, and typically personal injury, 
property damage and economic loss caused by such pollution.  The best known are the two 
cases that reached the House of Lords: Lubbe v Cape
62
 and Connelly v RTZ.
63
  In Lubbe v 
Cape, several thousand claimants either worked at or lived close to asbestos mines and 
processing plants situated in South Africa, which were owned by local subsidiaries of an 
English-based corporation.  The claimants commenced proceedings in England against the 
parent company arguing that they had contracted asbestiosis as a result of the defendant’s 
negligence to protect them from the exposure to asbestos.  In addition, claims were brought 
by four Italian claimants for the harm suffered while working at or living close to a factory 
owned by an Italian subsidiary of the English-based corporation.  The second case concerned 
a claim brought by Mr Connelly, a Scotsman.  He worked for four years in Namibia at a 
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uranium mine owned by a local subsidiary of an English-based corporation.  After returning 
to Scotland, he was diagnosed with suffering from cancer of the throat.  He then commenced 
proceedings in England against the parent company and one of its English subsidiaries 
claiming damages in negligence for the defendants’ failure to protect him from the effect of 
uranium ore dust on the mining site.  The issue in both cases was whether the English 
proceedings should be stayed on the basis of the forum non conveniens doctrine in a situation 
where adequate legal representation was unavailable in the natural forum because of the lack 
of legal aid and adequate conditional fee arrangements. 
The vast majority of other cases brought in England follow the same pattern.
64
  An 
English-based corporation operating in an extraction or chemical industry carries on its 
activities abroad, typically in a developing country, though a local subsidiary.  The workers 
of the subsidiary or people living in the area of its operations suffer personal injury, property 
damage or economic loss as a result of the exposure to a dangerous substance through the 
medium of water, land or air.  One case involved the persecution of environmental protesters.  
Victims typically face a number of obstacles to commence proceedings in their own country: 
inability to obtain adequate representation because of the lack of funding or local firms that 
can handle complex cases; inefficient and inexperienced judges and procedures; corruption; 
collusion with the multinational corporation; lower damages; withdrawal of the multinational 
corporation from the host country etc.  For these reasons, victims commence proceedings 
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against the parent company in the English courts.  This pattern is confirmed by a recent case 
brought in the Dutch courts
65
 and is also visible in ATCA litigation in the US courts, as 
exemplified by Kiobel.  A case that does not entirely fit this pattern is Trafigura.
66
  Trafigura 
is a Dutch incorporated oil trading company, with its operations base in London.  In 2006 it 
chartered a ship which illegally fly-tipped toxic waste at locations around Abidjan in Ivory 
Coast, after permission to offload the waste had been denied in several other countries.  Some 
30,000 claimants commenced a group action against Trafigura in England.  A criminal trial 
was also conducted in the Netherlands.  The case is unusual in that no overseas subsidiary 
was involved in the alleged poisoning of the claimants, although the defendant argued that 
the waste had been dumped by a licensed local independent contractor, which had been 
appointed in good faith.  Interestingly, claimants in all the English cases, as well as in 
Chandler v Cape,
67
 were represented by the same firm of London lawyers, Leigh Day.
68
 
Cases of international environmental litigation can be divided into several types by 
using the following criteria: the (de)localised nature of the actual or potential tort; the 
defendant’s corporate organisation; the defendant’s industry; the nature of the claimant (see 
table 1).  Sometimes, as in Bier and Land Oberösterreich v ČEZ, the tort is delocalised, in the 
sense that the defendant’s actions and/or damage are not confined to one country.  But, as the 
English experience shows, cases where the elements of the tort are localised, i.e. confined to 
one country only, are more common.  Depending on the defendant’s corporate organisation, 
cases of international environmental litigation also fall into two types.  In some cases, it is the 
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defendant’s acts or omissions that directly cause the damage, as in Bier, Land Oberösterreich 
v ČEZ and Trafigura.  In others, a defendant’s foreign subsidiary is also involved.  Since the 
foreign subsidiary often lacks funds or even ceases to exist before the claim is brought, 
claimants typically look for ways to ascribe liability to the parent company for the actions of 
the subsidiary.  An option is to rely on the ‘piercing of the corporate veil’, ‘enterprise 
liability’, agency and related doctrines.  Another option, regularly pursued in the English and 
recently in the Dutch courts, is to argue that the parent has breached a duty of care that it 
owes directly to the victims.  Such cases are frequently referred to as ‘foreign direct liability’ 
cases.
69
  Most cases concern extraction industries.  The minority of cases concern other 
industries such as the production of chemicals (Thor Chemicals), production and distribution 
of nuclear energy (Land Oberösterreich v ČEZ) and oil trading (Trafigura).  Finally, cases 
can in theory be divided into those where the claim is pursued by a private party or a public 
authority.  However, all of the mentioned cases involved private claimants.  Even in Land 
Oberösterreich v ČEZ, the claimant, an Austrian local authority, acted in a private capacity as 
a landowner.  The majority of claimants were victims of environmental damage.  A non-
governmental environmental organisation appeared as claimant in Bier and in the Dutch case 
of Akpan v Shell. 
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Table 1: classification of transnational environmental cases litigated in EU courts 
Case 
Nature of the 
tort 
Defendant’s 
corporate 
organisation 
Defendant’s 
industry 
Nature of the 
claimant 
Bier (CJEU, the 
Netherlands) 
Delocalised No subsidiary Potash mining Private 
Land 
Oberösterreich 
v ČEZ (CJEU, 
Austria) 
Delocalised No subsidiary 
Nuclear energy 
production and 
distribution 
Private 
Lubbe v Cape 
(England) 
Localised 
Involvement of 
a subsidiary 
Asbestos mining Private 
Connelly v RTZ 
(England) 
Localised 
Involvement of 
a subsidiary 
Asbestos mining Private 
Thor Chemicals 
(England) 
Localised 
Involvement of 
a subsidiary 
Production of 
mercury-based 
chemicals 
Private 
Durham v T&N 
Plc (England) 
Localised 
Involvement of 
a subsidiary 
Asbestos mining Private 
Guerrero v 
Monterrico 
Metals Plc 
(England) 
Localised 
Involvement of 
a subsidiary 
Copper mining Private 
Ocensa Pipeline 
litigation 
Localised 
Involvement of 
a subsidiary 
Oil exploration 
and exploitation 
Private 
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(England) 
Bodo 
Community v 
Shell (England) 
Localised 
Involvement of 
a subsidiary 
Oil exploration 
and exploitation 
Private 
Vava v Anglo 
American South 
Africa Ltd 
(England) 
Localised 
Involvement of 
a subsidiary 
Gold mining Private 
Akpan v Shell 
(the 
Netherlands) 
Localised 
Involvement of 
a subsidiary 
Oil exploration 
and exploitation 
Private 
Trafigura (civil 
proceedings in 
England; 
criminal trial in 
the Netherlands) 
Localised No subsidiary Oil trading Private 
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(2) Why some types of case are not litigated in EU courts 
The classification in Table 1 reveals two intriguing facts.  First, all cases where a defendant’s 
foreign subsidiary was involved concerned only extraction and chemical industries.  
Although transnational corporate groups also exist in other industries that have the potential 
to harm the environment, such as clothing, manufacturing and IT, no claims have thus far 
been brought against parents companies in such corporate groups.  Second, all cases involved 
private claimants.  Why has international environmental litigation against the parents of 
corporate groups involved only extraction and chemical industries?  Why have transnational 
environmental cases not been brought by public authorities?  Is international environmental 
litigation, for whatever reason, unsuitable for these types of case?  If so, the regulatory 
potential of European private international law is significantly curtailed.  The following text 
aims to answer these questions. 
With regard to the first question, an explanation lies in the fact that extraction and 
chemical industries are by their characteristics and location more likely to encounter 
environmental and human rights related problems.  Furthermore, as Muchlinski observes,
70
 
the corporate organisation of Cape (but also of the defendants in other cases of the same type) 
was ‘that of a hierarchical parent-subsidiary group, typical of early [multinational enterprises] 
operating in high-risk, capital-intensive extraction industries where economies of scale are 
important.’  These defendants ‘appear to fit into the theoretical model of the closely 
controlled, managerially centralised, MNE’.71  Modern forms of corporate organisation, 
however, involve subsidiaries or affiliates with substantially more autonomy.  The bonds of 
ownership are often replaced by purely contractual relations or even informal alliances.
72
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Modern forms of corporate organisation and business networks relate primarily to newer high 
technology industries such as information technology or advanced product manufacture.
73
  
Given the looser connections between the members of modern forms of corporate 
organisation and business networks, it is considerably more difficult to pierce the corporate 
veil or establish a direct duty of care on the part of the parent company in such an 
organisation or of the controlling enterprise(s), if any, in a network.
74
  Since the odds of 
winning the case are correspondingly reduced, the possibility for the workers of subsidiaries 
in such an organisation or of cooperating enterprises in a network and for the affected 
members of the general public of finding a law firm to represent them a ‘no win no fee’ basis 
is very remote.
75
 
Looking at the cases from the past two decades, it is surprising that no international 
environmental litigation in Europe has been brought by a public authority.
76
  After all, some 
transnational environmental cases concern pure environmental damage where no individual 
suffers actionable personal injury, property damage or economic loss or where such harm is 
thinly spread among a number of victims.  In such cases, it is usually up to public authorities 
to seek injunctive relief or clean up the pollution and seek recovery of the clean-up costs from 
the operator.  Indeed, the most important piece of EU environmental legislation, the 
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Environmental Liability Directive,
77
 is concerned only with claims by public authorities 
against operators for the enforcement of environmental standards and recovery of clean-up 
costs.  Although the Directive acknowledges potential actions by public authorities against 
foreign operators,
78
 it does not provide for any special procedures for the bringing of such 
actions.  One would therefore expect to find cases under the Brussels regime of public 
authorities from one Member State initiating proceedings abroad against foreign operators or 
of public authorities from one Member State seeking enforcement abroad of judgments 
rendered under the Directive. 
A reason for the lack of such cases may lie in the fact that there is a good argument 
that claims by public authorities under the Environmental Liability Directive concern public 
law.  Given that the Brussels regime applies only to ‘civil and commercial matters’,79 claims 
brought by public authorities abroad and judgments rendered under the Directive arguably 
fall outside its scope.  A leading case on the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ is 
Rüffer.
80
  This case concerned a claim by the Netherlands for the recovery of the costs 
involved in the removal of a wreck in a public waterway over which the Netherlands 
exercised river-police functions under a Dutch-German treaty.  The CJEU held that the claim 
did not arise in a civil or commercial matter, since the treaty conferred on the claimant the 
status of a public authority and the claimant exercised its public authority powers in removing 
the wreck.
81
  By analogy, it is arguable that the Directive confers on the competent authorities 
of Member States public authority powers which they exercise when enforcing environmental 
standards and claiming clean-up costs against operators.  If so, it would not mean that 
international environmental litigation by public authorities is completely precluded.  It would 
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mean that this type of litigation has to take place under the Member States’ traditional rules 
of jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement or foreign judgments and, if any, 
environmental treaties.  Given that the Member States’ traditional laws also contain public 
law exceptions
82
 and the dearth of civil liability environmental treaties,
83
 the prospect of 
international environmental litigation by public authorities in Europe is poor. 
Admittedly, it is not certain that claims by public authorities under the Environmental 
Liability Directive concern public law.  According to some scholars, these claims arise in a 
civil or commercial matter,
84
 and thus fall under the scope of the Brussels regime.  These 
scholars doubt the correctness of Rüffer in the light of subsequent cases, and advocate a 
systemic and ‘green’ interpretation of EU law concerning the protection of the environment. 
The Rüffer approach to ‘civil and commercial matters’ has been criticised as being 
inconsistent with the CJEU decisions in Sonntag
85
 and Baten.
86
  Sonntag concerned a claim 
for damages against a German state-school teacher for the accidental death of a pupil in his 
care on a school trip.  The CJEU held that the fact that the defendant had the status of a civil 
servant under German law and acted in that capacity at the relevant time was irrelevant.
87
  So 
was the fact that the case was covered by a scheme of social insurance under German public 
law that excluded a direct claim against the defendant.
88
  The Court found that the functions 
of the public authority should be analysed to determine whether its conduct constitutes the 
exercise of public powers going beyond those existing under the rules applicable to 
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relationship between private individuals.
89
  Since a teacher in a state school assumes the same 
functions in relation to their pupils as a teacher in a private school, the conduct of the former 
does not constitute the exercise of public powers.
90
  Baten concerned a claim by a Dutch local 
authority for the recovery of sums of money paid as social assistance to support the 
defendant’s child after the defendant had been divorced from the child’s mother.  The CJEU 
held that it was necessary to examine the basis and the detailed rules governing the bringing 
of the claim to determine whether it concerned a civil or commercial matter.
91
  Since the 
Dutch legislation allows recovery of the costs of social assistance up to the limit of the 
maintenance obligation under the Dutch Civil Code, it was the rules of civil law nature that 
determined the conditions under which the public authority might bring an action for the 
recovery of sums of money paid.
92
  The claimant’s legal situation was, therefore, comparable 
to that of a person who, having paid another’s debt, is subrogated to the rights of the original 
creditor and to that of a person who, having suffered damage from a third party, seeks 
compensation from that party.
93
  The CJEU also stated that the conclusion would be different 
if the local authority had the power to disregard a maintenance agreement entered into 
between the defendant and his ex-wife.
94
 
Similarly, Betlem, Bernasconi, Kadner Graziano, Plender and Wilderspin
95
 argue that 
the fact that public authorities enforcing environmental standards or claiming clean-up costs 
under the Environmental Liability Directive act in their public capacity is irrelevant.  The real 
question is whether their conduct constitutes the exercise of any powers going beyond those 
existing under the rules applicable to relations between private individuals.  Since claims for 
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the enforcement of environmental standards and recovery of clean-up costs against foreign 
operators typically arise in tort and, moreover, in some Member States can be made not just 
by public authorities but also by non-governmental environmental organisations,
96
 such 
claims concern ‘civil and commercial matters’, irrespective of the nature of the claimant. 
Furthermore, according to the mentioned scholars, the systemic interpretation of the 
Brussels regime leads to the conclusion that claims by public authorities under the 
Environmental Liability Directive fall within its scope.  The Directive acknowledges 
potential actions by public authorities against foreign operators but
 
provides no special 
procedures.  According to Kadner Graziano, Plender and Wilderspin, such actions must fall 
within the scope of the Brussels regime in order to be truly enforceable.
97
  Similarly, the 
special choice-of-law rules for environmental damage of Article 7 of Rome II, whose scope 
must be interpreted consistently with that of the Brussels regime,
98
 apply to cases of 
environmental damage irrespective of any harm to life, health property or financial wellbeing 
of individuals.  In cases of pure environmental damage, only public authorities, acting under 
the Directive, can commence proceedings for the enforcement of environmental standards 
and recovery of clean-up costs.  Since Article 7 of Rome II applies to cases of pure 
environmental damage, Kadner Graziano argues that claims by public authorities concerning 
such damage under the Directive must fall within the scope of Rome II and therefore also the 
Brussels regime.
99
  Betlem, Bernasconi, Plender and Wilderspin further rely on the Henkel 
case,
100
 where the CJEU held that a claim by a consumer protection organisation for an 
injunction to prevent a trader using allegedly unfair terms in its consumer contracts fell 
within the scope of the Brussels jurisdictional regime in general and the rule of jurisdiction in 
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tort in particular (now contained in Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Recast) on the basis that this 
interpretation was the only one consistent with the Unfair Contract Terms Directive.
101
  
Finally, according to Betlem and Bernasconi,
102
 the conclusion that claims by public 
authorities under the Directive concern ‘civil and commercial’ matters is supported by the 
‘green’ interpretation of EU law concerning the protection of the environment.  Since the 
application of the Brussels regime to claims by public authorities increases the chances of the 
operators’ liability, thus supporting the polluter-pays principle, such interpretation is to be 
preferred. 
The majority of scholars, however, are of the opinion that claims by public authorities 
under the Environmental Liability Directive fall outside the scope of the Brussels regime.
103
  
They all rely on Rüffer for this conclusion.  Indeed, Rüffer seems a stronger authority than 
Sonntag, Henkel and Baten.
104
  In Sonntag, a crucial point in the CJEU analysis was that a 
teacher in a state school and a teacher in a private school assume the same functions in 
relation to their pupils.  With regard to claims by public authorities under the Directive, such 
a private comparator is absent.  The role of non-governmental environmental organisations 
under the Directive is limited to submitting any observations concerning environmental 
damage to public authorities, requesting action from public authorities, and commencing 
review proceedings of public authorities’ decisions in response to the request.105  It is also for 
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this reason that Henkel is distinguishable.
106
  Here, the claim was brought under the Austrian 
implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, which expressly envisages court and 
administrative actions by persons or organisations having a legitimate interest in protecting 
consumers for the enforcement of its terms.
107
  It was the claimant’s status as a non-
governmental consumer organisation, and not the fact that it was pursuing an action to 
enforce EU law, that brought the claim within the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’.  
The Environmental Liability Directive, on the other hand, achieves its objectives by 
conferring enforcement powers on the Member State public authorities.  In Baten, it was the 
rules of the Dutch Civil Code that determined the conditions under which the public authority 
might bring an action for the recovery of sums of money paid.  The recovery of clean-up 
costs under the Directive is independent of the rules of civil law nature.  Indeed, there seems 
to be an agreement in the literature that the Directive takes an administrative approach that is 
strongly influenced by the situation in the US, where at the federal level environmental clean-
up is in the hands of the Environmental Protection Agency.
108
 
Furthermore, Dickinson and Fuchs provide counter-arguments to the systemic 
interpretation of the scope of the Brussels regime advanced by Kadner Graziano, Plender and 
Wilderspin.
109
  The cross-border enforcement of environmental standards and recovery of 
clean-up costs by public authorities involve mutual assistance, which is the subject of an EU 
measure under Article 192 TFEU, not private international law instruments adopted under 
Articles 67 and 81 TFEU.
110
  It is counterintuitive and contrary to the CJEU approach under 
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the Brussels regime to determine its scope by relying on the content of a choice-of-law rule of 
Rome II.
111
 
In conclusion, arguments on whether claims of public authorities under the 
Environmental Liability Directive fall within the scope of the Brussels I Recast are finely 
balanced.  Assuming that the majority view is correct, the narrow scope of this instrument 
prevents an important type of international environmental litigation from taking place in 
Europe.
112
  In any event, the legal uncertainty surrounding this issue possibly serves in itself 
as a deterrent to public authorities bringing transnational claims under the Directive.  Coupled 
with the fact that international environmental litigation against the parents of corporate 
groups seems to be effectively confined to extraction and chemical industries, this finding 
leads to the conclusion that the field in which European private international law can have a 
regulatory impact on the protection of the environment is relatively narrow.  This regulatory 
field is in effect limited to two types of case, namely the case of private claimants suing an 
operator whose actions in one country directly cause environmental damage elsewhere and 
the Lubbe v Cape type, but the latter exclusively with regard to extraction and chemical 
industries.  The following sections analyse how, within the scope of their practical operation, 
the rules of European private international law apply to these two types of case in order to 
examine whether, and to what extent, this field of law is achieving its regulatory potential.  
The analysis starts with the rules of jurisdiction. 
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Adjudicatory jurisdiction and environmental damage 
The Brussels I Recast allocates adjudicatory jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters 
among the Member State courts.  Its jurisdictional rules apply, in principle, to defendants 
domiciled in a Member State.
113
  The main rule is that the courts of the Member State of the 
defendant’s domicile have general jurisdiction over the defendant.114  There are also rules of 
special jurisdiction which confer jurisdiction, with regard to specific matters, on the courts of 
other Member States.  Since international environmental litigation typically concerns tortious 
claims, the rules of jurisdiction in tort are of particular relevance.  International 
environmental litigation in EU courts sometimes involves defendants not domiciled in a 
Member State.  In such cases, the Brussels I Recast delegates jurisdictional issues to the 
Member States’ traditional laws.  It will now be examined how these jurisdictional rules 
apply to the two types of case in which European private international law can have a 
regulatory impact that have been identified in the previous section. 
Claims against an operator domiciled in a Member State whose actions in one country 
directly cause environmental damage elsewhere can be brought in the courts of the operator’s 
domicile
115
 or in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.
116
  
The leading case on the determination of the place of the harmful event in delocalised torts is 
Bier.
117
  It will be remembered that this case concerned a French mining company that had 
polluted the Rhine by discharging in it in France saline waste from its operations.  A Dutch 
horticulturalist suffered damage as a result.  The CJEU held that the claimant had an option to 
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commence proceedings ‘either at the place where the damage occurred or the place of the 
event giving rise to it.’118  The CJEU case law on jurisdiction in delocalised torts also deals 
with claims for indirect damage (i.e. damage suffered by the victim as a consequence of the 
direct damage) and claims brought by indirect victims.  The case law demonstrates that the 
jurisdictionally relevant places are only the place where the direct victim suffers direct 
damage and the place of the event giving rise to it.
119
  Claims against an operator domiciled 
in a Member State that acts in one Member State and directly causes environmental damage 
in another can therefore be brought either in the courts for the place where the direct victim 
suffers direct damage or at the source of the pollution. 
The Lubbe v Cape type of case involving a European-based parent company operating 
in an extraction or chemical industry that carries on its activities in a developing country 
through a local subsidiary falls within the scope of the Brussels I Recast.  The courts of the 
Member State of the defendant’s domicile have general jurisdiction.120  This type of case has 
been frequently brought in the English and recently in the Dutch courts, and typically 
concerns direct liability in negligence of a European-based parent. 
An issue litigated in the past in England in this type of case
 
was whether the English 
courts should refuse to exercise their jurisdiction and stay their proceedings under the 
traditional English doctrine of forum non conveniens in favour of the courts of the developing 
country where the harmful event occurred.
121
  The CJEU held that the forum non conveniens 
doctrine had no role to play in cases falling within the scope of the Brussels Convention and 
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the Brussels I Regulation.
122
  The Brussels I Recast superseded the Brussels I Regulation on 
10 January 2015.  The Recast introduces one important change that has the potential to 
undermine international environmental litigation in EU courts.  Unlike the Brussels I 
Regulation, the Recast gives an amount of discretion to all Member State courts to stay their 
proceedings when parallel or related proceedings are already pending in a third country.  
According to Articles 33(1) and 34(1) of the Recast, where the jurisdiction of a Member State 
court is based on certain jurisdictional rules of the Recast, including all the rules relevant for 
international environmental litigation, and where at the time when the Member State court is 
seised with the dispute parallel or related proceedings are pending in a third country, the 
Member State court may stay its proceedings under two conditions.  The first is that it is 
expected that the court of the third country will give a judgment capable of recognition and, 
where applicable, of enforcement in the Member State concerned.  The second is that the 
court of the Member State is satisfied that a stay is necessary for the proper administration of 
justice.  Recital 24 clarifies the second condition: 
‘When taking into account the proper administration of justice, the court of the 
Member State concerned should assess all the circumstances of the case before it.  
Such circumstances may include connections between the facts of the case and the 
parties and the third State concerned, the stage to which the proceedings in the third 
State have progressed by the time proceedings are initiated in the court of the Member 
State and whether or not the court of the third State can be expected to give a 
judgment within a reasonable time.’ 
Articles 33(1) and 34(1) could lead to the ‘race to the court’, with the European-based parent 
company and its overseas subsidiary commencing preventive proceedings in the developing 
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country where the harmful event occurred.  In such cases, the Member State court seised with 
the claim against the parent may refuse to hear and decide the dispute under what comes 
close to the forum non conveniens doctrine. 
English cases such as Lubbe v Cape
123
 and Connelly v RTZ
124
 dealing with forum non 
conveniens in the context of international environmental litigation have therefore regained 
relevance.  These cases confirm that the fundamental principle in forum non conveniens cases 
is to identify the most appropriate forum in which the case may be tried suitably for the 
interests of all the parties and the ends of justice.  The English courts are instructed to look 
not just for the ‘natural forum’, i.e. the forum with which the action has its most real and 
substantial connection, but also to examine, if the natural forum is abroad, whether there are 
special circumstances by reason of which justice requires that litigation should nevertheless 
take place in England.  In both Lubbe v Cape and Connelly v RTZ the natural forum was 
abroad, in South Africa and Namibia, respectively.  Both cases therefore revolved around the 
issue of whether the claimants would obtain justice in the natural forum.  In both cases the 
House of Lords found that the claimants would not be able to obtain legal representation in 
the natural forum, and consequently refused to stay the proceeding under forum non 
conveniens. 
The Lubbe v Cape type of case may concern a claim brought in one Member State 
against a parent company domiciled in another.  The court seised with the claim will not have 
general jurisdiction over such parent.  Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Recast will be 
inapplicable, since the harmful event will have occurred in a third country.  The only other 
rule of special jurisdiction of the Recast that the claimants could rely on is Article 7(3) which 
gives jurisdiction to a court seised with criminal proceedings over a civil claim for damages 
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or restitution which is based on the criminal act giving rise to such proceedings.  This rule of 
jurisdiction is of potential relevance for Member States that deal with transnational 
environmental cases primarily through criminal law. 
In cases of international environmental litigation in which the defendant is domiciled 
in a third country, the Brussels I Recast delegates jurisdictional issues to the Member States’ 
traditional laws.  If the proceedings are commenced in England, for example, the English 
courts will have jurisdiction over the defendant that is properly served with the claim form 
whilst present in England.
125
  The English courts, however, may decide not to exercise their 
jurisdiction and stay their proceedings under the forum non conveniens doctrine.  Corporate 
defendants domiciled in third countries, however, are seldom present in England for 
jurisdictional purposes.  The majority of cases brought in England against non-EU defendant 
thus revolve around the issue of whether the English courts should grant the claimant 
permission to serve an absent defendant with the claim form out of the jurisdiction.
126
  
Permission depends on the claimant being able to satisfy three requirements.  First, the 
claimant must have a reasonable prospect of success on the merits.
127
  Second, the claimant 
must have a good arguable case that the claim falls within a head of jurisdiction listed in Civil 
Procedure Rules, Practice Direction 6B.
128
  Since international environmental litigation 
typically concerns tortious claims, para 3.1(9) of the Practice Direction 6B is of particular 
relevance.  Under this provision, the English courts may assume jurisdiction if damage was 
sustained within the jurisdiction or the damage resulted from an act committed within the 
jurisdiction.  Unlike Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Recast, the case law demonstrates that para 
3.1(9) of the Practice Direction 6B applies not just when the direct victim suffers direct 
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damage in England or when the place of the event giving rise to it is in England but also 
when either the direct victim suffers indirect damage or when the indirect victim suffers 
damage in England.
129
  Third, England must be forum conveniens.
130
 
International environmental litigation of the Lubbe v Cape type sometimes involves 
not just a claim against a European-based parent company but also a claim against its 
subsidiary domiciled in or outside the EU.  Claimants can rely on Article 8(1) of the Brussels 
I Recast concerning jurisdiction over co-defendants to establish jurisdiction over subsidiaries 
domiciled in the EU.  With regard to non-EU subsidiaries, claimants will have to invoke the 
Member States’ traditional rules of jurisdiction.  If the proceedings against a non-EU 
subsidiary are commenced in England, for example, the claimants can rely on para 3.1(3) of 
the Practice Direction 6B concerning jurisdiction over necessary or proper parties.  The other 
two requirements for service out of the jurisdiction, namely a reasonable prospect of success 
on the merits and forum conveniens, will also have to be satisfied.  Given that the English 
courts are loath to split up proceedings involving co-defendants,
131
 it seems that claimants 
will easily satisfy these requirements. 
In conclusion, the rules of jurisdiction of the Brussels I Recast deal satisfactorily with 
the type of international environmental litigation in which the claim is brought against an EU 
domiciliary acting in one Member State and directly causing environmental damage in 
another.  In such cases, victims may access several forums, most importantly the courts for 
the place of the direct damage suffered by direct victims.  This place usually coincides with 
the habitual residence of direct victims and the place where the damaged property is located.  
If a claim for a delocalised tort is brought against a non-EU domiciliary, the jurisdiction of 
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the Member State court seised with the claim depends on the traditional law of that Member 
State.  The English traditional jurisdictional rules applicable in this type of case, for example, 
seem to be somewhat wider than the analogous jurisdictional rules of the Brussels I Recast.  
These rules therefore also put victims in this type of case in a good litigational position. 
With regard to the Lubbe v Cape type of case, the jurisdictional rules of the Brussels I 
Recast are also favourable for victims as they may commence proceedings against a parent 
company domiciled in the EU in the courts of its domicile, and those courts must hear and 
decide the case.  The Recast, however, represents a setback for this type of case as it 
introduces a discretion that comes close to the forum non conveniens doctrine.  Although 
Lubbe v Cape
132
 and Connelly v RTZ
133
 show that the English courts have been reluctant to 
use this doctrine in the context of international environmental litigation, there is no guarantee 
that the attitude of the CJEU, which is the ultimate interpreter of the Recast, will be the 
same.
134
  The Lubbe v Cape type of case also sometimes concerns a claim against a 
subsidiary domiciled either in or outside the EU.  Both the Brussels I Recast and the English 
traditional rules of jurisdiction provide for this scenario.  In theory, the Lubbe v Cape type of 
case could also concern a claim against a non-EU parent.  Such cases, however, do not arise 
in practice, possibly because it would be hard to obtain jurisdiction of the Member State 
courts in such cases. 
The following text continues the examination of the regulation of the environment in 
European private international law by exploring how the special choice-of-law rules for 
environmental damage of Rome II apply to the two types of case in which European private 
international law can have a regulatory impact. 
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Choice of law and the Bier type of case 
Article 7 of Rome II contains special choice-of-law rules for environmental damage: 
‘The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of environmental 
damage or damage sustained by persons or property as a result of such damage shall 
be the law determined pursuant to Article 4(1), unless the person seeking 
compensation for damage chooses to base his or her claim on the law of the country in 
which the event giving rise to the damage occurred.’ 
Article 4(1), in turn, provides: 
‘…the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall 
be the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in 
which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or 
countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur.’ 
For the purposes of these rules, ‘environmental damage’ is defined as an ‘adverse change in a 
natural resource, such as water, land or air, impairment of a function performed by that 
resource for the benefit of another natural resource or the public, or impairment of the 
variability among living organisms.’135  Also relevant are Articles 14 (‘Freedom of choice’), 
16 (‘Overriding mandatory rules’), 17 (‘Rules of safety and conduct’) and 26 (‘Public 
policy’). 
The scope of Article 7 is wide, although there is some uncertainty in this respect.  It 
clearly covers personal injury, property damage, economic loss and pure environmental 
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damage.  It is also clear that nuclear damage is excluded.
136
  According to some scholars, 
Article 7 is wide enough to cover cases brought under the English law of negligence, 
trespass, nuisance, Rylands v Fletcher
137
 and breach of statutory duty.
138
  Others, however, 
interpret the scope of Article 7 more narrowly.
139
 
The special choice-of-law rules for environmental damage are based on the principles 
of ubiquity, favouring the victim and, to a limited extent, party autonomy.  Article 7 provides 
that the law applicable to environmental damage is by default the law of the country of the 
damage (lex loci damni), but the victim can choose the law of the country of the event giving 
rise to the damage (lex loci actus).  There is no escape clause allowing the courts to apply the 
law of the parties’ common habitual residence or the law that is manifestly more closely 
connected with the tort.  The question when the victim can make the choice is one of 
procedure, governed by the law of the forum.
140
  If the lex loci damni applies, Article 17 
becomes relevant.  It provides that, in assessing the conduct of the person claimed to be 
liable, account should be taken, as a matter of fact and in so far as is appropriate, of the rules 
of safety and conduct in force at the place and time of the event giving rise to the damage.  
This provision allows the court, when determining liability, to take into account the fact that 
the defendant, who is sued for damage suffered in one country and under the law of that 
country, has complied with the public law rules concerning safety and conduct of the lex loci 
actus.  Article 14 allows the parties to agree on the applicable law either after the event 
giving rise to the damage occurred or, where all the parties are pursuing a commercial 
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activity, even by an agreement freely negotiated before the event giving rise to the damage 
occurred.  Article 16 allows the court to apply the overriding mandatory provisions of the law 
of the forum.  Article 26 allows the court to disregard a provision of the foreign applicable 
law whose application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the forum. 
Some of the ideas that motivated the CJEU decisions in Bier
141
 and other 
jurisdictional cases on delocalised torts
142
 underlie Article 7 of Rome II.  Just as a claimant 
whose claim falls within the scope of the Brussels I Recast may commence proceedings 
either in the country where the direct victim suffers direct damage or in the country of the 
event giving rise to it, so can the victim of environmental damage advance their claim under 
the law of either country under Rome II.    The scopes of the Recast and Rome II, however, 
differ in an important respect.  Whilst the jurisdictional rules of the Recast apply in civil and 
commercial matters and, in principle, to defendants domiciled in a Member State,
143
 Rome II 
is of universal application.  It applies, in all situations involving a conflict of laws, to non-
contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters regardless of whether the applicable 
law is the law of a Member State.
144
  In other words, whilst the Brussels I Recast regime is 
concerned only with torts connected with the EU, Rome II, at least in theory, applies to all 
delocalised torts regardless of the place of the environmental damage or the defendant’s 
actions. 
Universal application of Rome II, coupled with the superiority of the principles of 
ubiquity and favouring the victim and the limited acceptance of party autonomy on which its 
special choice-of-law rules for environmental damage are based, are the main grounds on 
which the supporters of these rules base their conclusion that Rome II adequately pursues the 
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cosmopolitan objectives of EU environmental policy.
145
  Comparative overviews of choice-
of-law rules for environmental damage disclose a diversity of connecting factors.
146
  For 
example, some point exclusively to the lex loci damni, others exclusively to the lex loci actus.  
In some countries, the applicable law is determined pursuant to the principle of the closest 
connection.  Some countries allow party autonomy.  Some do not.  But all of these 
connecting factors on their own and the unlimited acceptance of party autonomy have certain 
drawbacks when compared with the special choice-of-law rules of Rome II. 
The connecting factor of the place of the damage is said to be protective of the 
victim’s interests as it often coincides with their habitual residence and the place where the 
damaged property is located.
147
  It is further justified by the fact that the main objective of 
tort law is compensation for the harm suffered, often under the system of strict liability, not 
vengeance or retribution.
148
  In the words of the European Commission: ‘The basic 
connection to the law of the place where the damage was sustained is in conformity with 
recent objectives of environmental protection policy, which tends to support strict 
liability.’149  The downside of this connecting factor is that the victim cannot invoke the 
potentially higher environmental standards of the country of the tortious action.
150
  According 
to the European Commission: ‘Applying exclusively the law of the place where the damage is 
sustained could give an operator an incentive to establish his facilities at the border so as to 
discharge toxic substances into a river and enjoy the benefit of the neighbouring country’s 
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laxer rules.’151  Furthermore, since environmental damage can be suffered in more than one 
country, claims of victims of the same tortious action may fall under different applicable laws 
containing different environmental standards.
152
  This is a serious downside for a rule called 
to deal with mass torts where ideally all victims should be treated equally.
153
 
The connecting factor of the place of the event giving rise to the damage avoids the 
potential application of different laws to claims of victims of the same tortious action.  It is 
also often justified with the tortfeasor’s interests in mind – the tortfeasor can be expected to 
know and comply with the law of the country of the event but not with the potentially 
multiple laws of the countries of the damage.
154
  The downside of this connecting factor is 
that it gives countries that already host polluting industries an incentive to decrease their 
environmental standards where the environmentally detrimental and degrading effects of 
those industries are exclusively or primarily felt across the border.
155
  It also increases the 
incentives of operators moving to the country with the laxest standards and could lead to the 
‘race to the bottom’.156  The lex loci actus can be a law unconnected and unfamiliar to the 
victim, whose application they do not expect.
157
  In international environmental litigation 
there is no justification for favouring the interests of polluters over those of victims. 
The principle of the closest connection is also not an optimal solution.  The most 
closely connected country will ordinarily be either the country of the damage or the country 
of the event giving rise to the damage.  The downsides of these two connecting factors are 
therefore attributable to the principle of the closest connection. 
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With regard to party autonomy, there is a concern that the operator, typically a big 
corporation, might abuse its typically superior bargaining power and impose upon the 
potential victims of environmental damage the application of the law favourable for it.  That 
is why Rome II does not allow ex ante choice-of-law agreements, assuming they are 
practically possible in the context of international environmental litigation.
158
  Ex post 
choice-of-law agreements, on the other hand, are considered useful and appropriate as they 
enable the operator and all the victims to agree on the application of only one law, thus 
facilitating the settlement of disputes.
159
  Ex post choice-of-law agreements do not raise 
concerns of the abuse of the operator’s typically superior bargaining power, since the victim, 
after the risk materialises, is in a position to assess the pros and cons of the application of 
different laws.  They will not easily give up their rights under the law(s) applicable by 
default, and will agree to the application of another law only if they consider that to be in 
their interest.  A further concern is that party autonomy should not be used to undermine the 
rights and obligations of third parties. 
The special choice-of-law rules for environmental damage of Rome II are considered 
superior to choice-of-law rules based on the connecting factors considered above.  By opting 
for the alternative application of the lex loci damni and the lex loci actus, Article 7 combines 
the positive characteristics of the two connecting factors, whilst avoiding most of their 
downsides.  In particular, it reduces the problem of potential application of different laws to 
claims of victims of the same tortious action.  It neither gives operators an incentive to 
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establish their facilities at the border so as to enjoy the application of the neighbouring 
country’s laxer environmental standards nor leads to the ‘race to the bottom’.  It provides for 
the default application of the lex loci damni.  The default rule seems to be based on the 
assumption that the victim will typically commence proceedings in the country of their 
habitual residence where they suffer personal injury, property damage and economic loss, 
thus leading to the application of the local law.
160
  But the victim can choose the lex loci 
actus if it is more favourable for them, i.e. if it contains higher standards.  Furthermore, 
Article 7 is justifiable in terms of legitimate expectations, fairness and state interests.
161
  
Operators should expect the application of the law of the country of the tortious action and, to 
a certain extent, of the country of the damage.  Victims, on the other hand, typically expect 
the application of the law of the country where their injured interests are situated, but also 
have an interest in the application of the higher standards of the lex loci actus.  The state of 
the tortious action has an interest in ensuring compliance with its standards, whereas the state 
of the damage has an interest in protecting its environment.  In addition, the latter country has 
no interest in displacing higher standards of the former country as doing so would lead to a 
higher risk of environmental damage in the latter country.  It is for all these reasons that 
Article 7 is said to pursue the cosmopolitan objective of raising the general level of 
environmental protection on the basis of the universally accepted principles of environmental 
law.
162
 
But this conclusion does not sufficiently take into account the context in which 
international environmental litigation takes place.  In some cases, as Bier
163
 and Land 
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Oberösterreich v ČEZ164 demonstrate, the environmental damage and the tortious action 
occur in different countries.  Indeed, Article 7 produces beneficial effects in this type of case.  
But both Bier and Land Oberösterreich v ČEZ, and presumably the vast majority of cases of 
this type that end up in EU courts concern intra-EU delocalised environmental torts.  
Presumably, the minority of cases concern delocalised environmental torts where one of the 
elements of the tort occurs within and the other outside the EU.  It is unlikely that the 
Member State courts will be seised with a claim concerning the Bier type of case where both 
elements of the tort occur entirely outside the EU.  The exception is where a delocalised 
environmental tort is committed by an overseas subsidiary of a European parent company.  
But this is the Lubbe v Cape type of case, to which this article now turns.  In conclusion, the 
effect of Article 7 in the Bier type of case is to raise the level of environmental protection 
within the EU and at its borders,
165
 which in itself falls short of the proclaimed cosmopolitan 
objectives. 
 
Choice of law and the Lubbe v Cape type of case 
In the Lubbe v Cape type of case, environmental damage is typically suffered in a developing 
country as a result of the local activities of a multinational corporation carried on through a 
local subsidiary.  Victims typically commence proceedings against the parent company in its 
home country for breaching a duty of care that it allegedly owes them directly.  Sometimes 
victims argue that the parent should be liable for the actions of the subsidiary on the basis of 
the piercing of the corporate veil, enterprise liability, agency and similar doctrines. 
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A recent development in English substantive law, the Court of Appeal decision in 
Chandler v Cape,
166
 might encourage overseas victims to bring ‘foreign direct liability’ cases 
in the English courts.  This case resembles Lubbe v Cape,
167
 the main difference being that it 
had no international elements.  In a nutshell, Mr Chandler was employed by a defendant’s 
subsidiary.  Asbestos was produced on the site where he worked.  Some fifty years later Mr 
Chandler contracted asbestosis.  As his former employer had been dissolved, he commenced 
proceedings against the parent company.  The trial judge found in favour of the claimant.  
The Court of Appeal confirmed that a duty of care should be imposed on the defendant for 
the health and safety of its subsidiary’s employees because (i) the businesses of the two 
companies were in a relevant respect the same, and the parent (ii) had, or ought to have had, 
superior knowledge on some relevant aspect of health and safety in the particular industry, 
(iii) knew, or ought to have known, that the subsidiary’s system of work was unsafe, and (iv) 
knew, or ought to have foreseen, that the subsidiary or its employees would rely on its using 
that superior knowledge for the employees’ protection.168  It seems that a duty of care can be 
imposed on the same grounds on a parent company for the health and safety of people living 
in the area of its subsidiary’s operations.  If an international environmental litigation is 
brought in England under Chandler, the main question will be whether English law applies to 
the issue of the parent’s liability because only then can a duty of care be imposed on a parent 
domiciled in England for the environmental damage caused by its overseas subsidiary under 
the principles laid down in Chandler. 
The answer to this question will largely depend on the classification of the relevant 
issue.  In Chandler, Arden LJ ‘emphatically reject[ed] any suggestion that this court [was] in 
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any way concerned with what is usually referred to as piercing the corporate veil’169 and 
clarified that ‘[t]he question is simply whether what the parent company did amounted to 
taking on a direct duty to the subsidiary’s employees.’170  The tortious classification of the 
relevant issue in English substantive law, however, is not determinative for the purposes of 
Rome II.  This instrument applies ‘in situations involving a conflict of laws, to non-
contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters.’171  Some civil and commercial 
matters are expressly excluded from the scope of Rome II, most importantly for the present 
discussion ‘non-contractual obligations arising out of the law of companies...such as...the 
personal liability of...members as such for the obligations of the company.’172  Whether an 
issue is a matter of company law is determined by autonomous interpretation.
173
  If the issue 
of whether a parent company is liable under the Chandler principles is a company law matter 
for the purposes of Rome II, then the traditional choice-of-law rules will determine whether 
English law applies.  If not, the choice-of-law rules of Rome II will provide the answer. 
 
(1) ‘Foreign direct liability’: a matter of tort law or company law? 
Separate legal personality of the company and its shareholders and their limited liability are 
two of the oldest doctrines in company law.
174
  They are a product of the early Industrial 
Revolution.  Capital needed by the companies of the first half of the nineteenth century to 
exploit the emerging technology and conduct major infrastructure projects was raised from 
the public through sale of shares.  The resulting separation between investors and managers 
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required the limitation of liability of the former to the amount of their investment.  Moreover, 
any potential liability of subsequent purchasers of shares beyond the amount of their 
investment would have reduced the marketability of shares and affected the functioning of 
stock exchanges.
175
 Limited liability also encourages entrepreneurial activity and reduces 
monitoring costs for investors, thus further promoting the marketability of shares and the 
diversification of investors’ share portfolios. 
Limited liability arose at a time when, except by a special act of the legislature, a 
company could not own shares in another company.
176
  In England this occurred in 1855 
through the passing of the Limited Liability Act.  Corporate groups became possible only 
later.  The key feature of the latter development was the extension of limited liability to 
parent companies within corporate groups.  However, as Blumberg notes, no court has ever 
examined, in a case involving the liability of a parent for the actions of its subsidiary, whether 
the doctrine of limited liability should protect the parent to the same extent that it protects 
shareholders/investors from corporate debts.
177
  Unlike investors in a company who are 
detached from its management, a parent and its subsidiary form part of a single economic 
entity under the control of the former.  When applied to involuntary creditors of a group, e.g. 
the victims of environmental damage caused by a subsidiary, the extension of limited liability 
shifts the risk of liability onto them.
178
  But this shifting of risk is hard to justify.  Unlike 
voluntary creditors of the group who knowingly and willingly assume the risks associated 
with the parent’s limited liability, typically in return for consideration, involuntary creditors 
are in a fundamentally different position.  The parent can externalise the risk without having 
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to compensate them.  Although it may be argued that limited liability is needed to ensure that 
the group will take on the enterprise risk, such argument is inapplicable where creating a 
subsidiary is done purely for business organisation purposes.
179
  Even where a subsidiary is 
established as a vehicle for new and risky investments, the shifting of the risk of liability onto 
involuntary creditors is hard to justify in the light of the fact that they are typically uninsured 
and in a much worse position than the group to obtain insurance.
180
  Furthermore, the risk of 
moral hazard speaks against the parent’s limited liability in such situations.181  The courts 
have never inquired whether this radical development required a reconsideration of the 
doctrine of limited liability.  Although there have been calls for shifting the focus from the 
liability of individual members of a group to enterprise liability
182
 such calls remain largely 
theoretical. 
Limited liability, of course, is not absolute.  In English company law, for example, 
exceptions include the piercing of the corporate veil and the common-law concepts of agency 
law.  But these exceptions fail to provide an adequate solution in most cases.  According to 
Blumberg, ‘[t]his is one of the most unsatisfactory areas of the law’, ‘[w]ith hundreds of 
irreconcilable decisions and shifting rationales’, that functions ‘in an almost inscrutable 
manner behind conclusory metaphors such as “mere instrumentality”, “sham”, “adjunct”, 
“agent, “alter ego”, “puppet”, or dozens of similarly murky terms’.183  It is therefore not 
surprising that claimants in many cases of the Lubbe v Cape type attempt to avoid the 
piercing of the corporate veil and agency doctrines, and instead proceed on the basis of the 
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parent company’s direct tortious liability.  Meeran, a partner in Leigh Day who was involved 
in many of the English cases described above, draws an interesting parallel between cases of 
this type and product liability cases: 
‘Save that one is dealing with “processes” rather than “products” an analogous duty to 
that owed by a manufacturer to consumers should be imposed (“process” liability).  
Indeed here it is arguable that the proximity of a [transnational corporation] to 
overseas employees of its subsidiaries [and the people in its vicinity] is closer than 
that of a manufacturer to consumers of its products.’184 
Chandler
185
 is the first, and so far the only, English case where a parent was held directly 
liable towards the victims of its subsidiary’s operations. 
The question whether the issue of a parent company’s liability under the Chandler 
principles falls under the company law exclusion from the scope of Rome II is determined by 
autonomous interpretation.  Guidance can be found in the CJEU case law on the definition of 
the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ for the purposes of the Brussels jurisdictional 
regime.  It will be remembered that in Baten
186
 the CJEU held that it was necessary to 
examine the basis and the detailed rules governing the bringing of a claim to determine 
whether it concerned a civil or commercial matter. 
Much has been written about the nature of the Chandler type of liability in English 
law.  Almost all scholars agree with Arden LJ that the case was in no way concerned with the 
piercing of the corporate veil.
187
  In essence, a duty of care was imposed on the parent 
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company because control represented an assumption of responsibility, which, in turn, 
satisfied the requirements of proximity and justice demanded by the duty of care analysis in 
the English law of torts.  Chandler has been criticised for conflating the four elements of 
control, assumption of responsibility, proximity and fairness into one ‘pragmatic’ inquiry into 
circumstances in which a duty of care might exist, and introducing a degree of uncertainty 
with regard to each of them.
188
  Nevertheless, one thing is clear.  Control was the key factor 
for imposing a duty of care.  The nature of the relevant control is therefore crucial for 
determining whether the Chandler type of liability concerns tort law or company law for the 
purposes of Rome II.  As Joseph explains, the control test in direct liability cases is different 
than in piercing cases: 
‘The issue is not control by the parent over the subsidiary.  Rather, the relevant 
control is that exercised by the parent over the conduct which gave rise to the tort at 
issue.  Thus, the relevant “control test” focuses on the extent to which a parent is 
somehow in control of the causes of the tort, which will be linked to, but will not be 
the same as, the issue of a parent’s control over its subsidiary. 
Similarly, a parent corporation may attract direct liability if it undertakes to perform 
services for a subsidiary...  For example, employees of subsidiaries have successfully 
sued parent companies on the basis that the parent undertook but failed to provide a 
safe working place on behalf of the subsidiary.‘189 
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Indeed, some of the relevant features of Chandler are that the parent had employed group 
medical and safety officers who had overseen the health and safety of employees across the 
group, that the contemporaneous documents, such as board minutes, showed that the parent 
had taken a direct interest in the working practices of the subsidiary that had employed the 
claimant, and that the parent and the subsidiary had shared directors who had been fully 
aware of what had been happening on the ground.
190
  Looking from this perspective, the 
Chandler type of liability is a matter of tort law for the purposes of Rome II.  Consequently, 
the Chandler principles apply only if English law is the law governing the tort pursuant to the 
choice-of-law rules of Rome II. 
Chandler is at the borderline of tort law and company law, and it is not inconceivable 
that the CJEU might classify the relevant issue as one of company law for choice-of-law 
purposes.  Indeed, at least one scholar commenting on Chandler has adopted such a view.
191
  
Assuming that the relevant issue is classified as one of company law, would English law, 
including the Chandler principles, apply in a case of the Lubbe v Cape type brought in 
England against an English-based parent company?  Such a classification would take the 
relevant issue outside the scope of Rome II, and the law governing that issue would be 
determined pursuant to the traditional English choice-of-law rules.  The content of those 
rules, however, is unclear.
192
  The choice seems to lie between the law of the forum, the law 
governing the parent, the law governing the subsidiary, the law governing the tort or any of 
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those that is most favourable to the claimant.  Scholarly opinions are divided.  According to 
the authors of Dicey, Morris & Collins, all matters concerning the constitution of a 
corporation are governed by the law of its place of incorporation.
193
  Similarly, Nygh favours 
the law governing the subsidiary
 
on the basis that the relationship between a company and its 
shareholders should be determined by the law governing the company.
194
  Some are in favour 
of the law governing the tort, especially when the tort is committed in the forum.
195
  
Lowenfeld proposes a unique solution that favours the claimant:
196
 if the forum is where the 
parent is established and its law imposes a liability on it in respect of the actions of its foreign 
subsidiary, then that law should be applied; if, on the other hand, the law of the country of the 
injury imposes enterprise liability but the law of the parent does not, then the former law 
should be applied. 
In conclusion, it seems that the issue of whether a duty of care should be imposed on a 
parent company under the Chandler principles is to be classified as tortious for choice-of-law 
purposes, thus triggering the application of the choice-of-law rules of Rome II.  In the 
unlikely case that this issue is classified as pertaining to company law, the English traditional 
choice-of-law rules will determine the governing law.  Although not free from doubt, it seems 
that the law applicable to this issue under the traditional rules would be the law of the 
subsidiary.  If so, English law, including the Chandler principles, would not apply in the 
Lubbe v Cape type of case brought in the English courts against an English-based parent 
company, but typically the law of a developing country.  This law will typically contain laxer 
environmental and compensation standards in comparison with the law of the parent 
company’s home country. 
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(2) Choice of law in tort 
If the issue of whether a parent company is liable under the Chandler principles is classified 
as a tort law matter for the purposes of Rome II, the choice-of-law rules of that instrument 
will determine whether English law applies. 
In the Lubbe v Cape type of case, important decisions concerning the operations of 
the subsidiary are typically taken by the parent company in its home country.  Decisions vary 
from those concerning general issues of policy to those concerning day-to-day operations.  
The notorious Bhopal litigation
197
 represents one end of the scale, where the documents seem 
to have shown that the decision to shut off the refrigeration unit on the tank of methyl-
isocyanate in Bhopal, India, which led to the warming up and explosion of the gas, was taken 
in the parent’s US headquarters, and communicated by letter to the management of the Indian 
subsidiary.  Typically, however, claimants allege that the parent’s superior knowledge of the 
health and safety issues and knowledge of the subsidiary’s unsafe system of work, coupled 
with its inaction, are the grounds for holding the parent liable.  According to Article 7 of 
Rome II, the law applicable to environmental damage is by the default the lex loci damni, but 
the victim can choose the lex loci actus.  In the Lubbe v Cape type of case, it is clear that the 
country of the damage is the country of the subsidiary.  The key question is therefore whether 
the decisions concerning the operations of the subsidiary taken by the parent in its home 
country that start the chain of events resulting in environmental damage are to be considered 
as the relevant event for the purposes of Article 7. 
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Opinions are divided.  Some scholars argue that the decisions taken by the parent 
company constitute the relevant event,
198
 others that the relevant event is the tortious action 
of the subsidiary directly causing the environmental damage.
199
  To answer the question, one 
should look closely at the choice-of-law rules of Rome II and at the case law on Article 7(2) 
of the Brussels I Recast.  Article 7 of Rome II states that the law applicable to environmental 
damage is ‘the law determined pursuant to Article 4(1)’, or, if the victim so chooses, the law 
of the country of the event giving rise to the damage.  According to Article 4(1), the 
applicable law for torts in general is the law of the country where the direct damage occurs 
regardless of where the indirect damage occurs.  The focus on the direct damage is said to be 
required by the principles of legal certainty and foreseeability and by the need to ‘ensure a 
fair balance between the interests of the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining 
the damage’.200  The parent company’s decisions in its home country that start the chain of 
events resulting in environmental damage can be regarded as an ‘indirect event’ in the sense 
that it precedes the subsidiary’s tortious action causing the damage directly.  Should the 
distinction between direct and indirect damage for the purposes of Article 4(1) be applied by 
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analogy to the question of the nature of the event giving rise to the damage for the purposes 
of Article 7, this ‘indirect event’ would be disregarded for choice-of-law purposes. 
There are no CJEU cases on this point.  The case law on Article 7(2) of the Brussels I 
Recast is potentially relevant.  As mentioned, the CJEU cases dealing with the jurisdictional 
treatment of indirect damage and indirect victims demonstrate that only the place where the 
direct victim suffers direct damage is of jurisdictional relevance.
201
  Should this distinction be 
applied by analogy to the question of the nature of the event giving rise to the damage for the 
purposes of Article 7 of Rome II, both the ‘indirect event’ (i.e. the parent company’s 
decisions in its home country that start the chain of events resulting in environmental 
damage) and the actions of the ‘indirect tortfeasor’ (i.e. the parent whose decisions concern 
the operations of the subsidiary) would be disregarded for choice-of-law purposes.  This logic 
seems to be supported by a recent CJEU decision in Melzer v MF Global UK Ltd.
202
  Here, a 
German private investor brought a tortious claim in Germany against an English broker 
trading in futures on the basis that he had been solicited as a client in Germany by a German 
company.  The defendant seems to have been sued both for its own alleged wrongdoing in 
England and for assisting the German company’s alleged wrongdoing in Germany.203  
Furthermore, it seems to have been conceded that the only viable jurisdictional basis was 
with respect to the German company’s alleged wrongdoing in Germany, which the defendant 
had allegedly assisted.
204
  As Dickinson explains, this case ‘appears to be an attempt to turn 
the tort upside down – to treat a tort committed in London with facilitation from Germany, as 
one committed in Germany with facilitation from London’.205  The CJEU interpreted Article 
5(3) of Brussels I, the predecessor of Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Recast, strictly and refused 
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to allow the German courts to assume jurisdiction over the English co-perpetrator.   Similarly, 
in the Lubbe v Cape type of case victims attempt to treat a tort committed in a developing 
country with facilitation from a developed country as a tort committed in a developed 
country.  Should Melzer be applied by analogy to Article 7 of Rome II, this argument is 
bound to fail.  Shevill,
206
 another leading CJEU case on the determination of the place of the 
event giving rise to the damage for the purposes of Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Recast, is of 
little help.  Here, a libel victim sued a publisher of a newspaper distributed in several Member 
States.  The CJEU held that, in a case of this kind, the place of the event giving rise to the 
damage can only be the place where the publisher is established, since that is the place where 
the harmful event originated and from which the libel was issued and put into circulation.  
But since there were no joint tortfeasors in Shevill, this case is of limited relevance for the 
present discussion. 
Two cases that are arguably to the point are the English High Court cases of Anton 
Durbeck GmbH v Den Norske Bank ASA
207
 and Vava v Anglo American South Africa Ltd.
208
  
In the first case the defendants were alleged to have unlawfully interfered with the claimant’s 
contracts for the carriage of goods by arresting the vessel in Panama.  The decision to arrest 
the vessel was taken by the defendant’s London branch.  According to the court: 
‘In one sense the decision of the branch of the Defendants in London can be said to 
have given rise to and to be the origin of the damage because the arrest is executed 
pursuant to that decision.  However, it can also be said that the arrest is the event 
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which gives rise to the damage and is the origin of the damage because without the 
arrest there would be no interference with the contracts of carriage.’209 
The court held that the event giving rise to the damage for the purposes of Article 5(3) of the 
Brussels I Regulation occurred in Panama.  In Vava v Anglo American South Africa Ltd,
210
 
the court was concerned with the question whether the defendant, a South African subsidiary 
of an English-based parent company, was domiciled in England for jurisdictional purposes.  
The claimants argued that the defendant’s central administration was in England because the 
management entrepreneurial decisions relating to its business had been taken in England at 
the headquarters of the parent.  The court, however, held that a company’s central 
administration was not where such decisions were taken, regardless of whether they were 
taken by the company, its parent or anyone else.  An important reason was that accepting the 
claimants’ argument would mean that if such decisions were determined predominantly by 
the wishes of a bank or other institution on which it relied for its financial survival, then the 
defendant would have its central administration where the bank or institution took its 
decisions.  These two cases show that the English courts interpret restrictively the relevant 
jurisdictional connecting factors in cases in which there are joint tortfeasors.  If these cases 
are applied by analogy to the choice-of-law context in the Lubbe v Cape type of case, the 
tortious action of the subsidiary directly causing environmental damage will be considered as 
the relevant event for the purposes of Article 7 of Rome II. 
It is also important to look at the High Court decision in RTZ v Connelly
211
 and the 
second Court of Appeal decision in Lubbe v Cape.
212
  Wright J, when dealing with the case 
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after the decision of the House of Lords in RTZ v Connelly,
213
 was clear that the cause of 
action had arisen in Namibia for the purposes of the common law choice-of-law rules.  It was 
not the making of decisions in England that was crucial, but the concrete results that this 
produced in Namibia.
214
  His Lordship also referred to a decision of the Court of Appeal to 
similar effect in Durham v T&N Plc.
215
  In Lubbe v Cape, the second Court of Appeal
216
 
departed from the decision of the first Court of Appeal
217
 that, for the purposes of the 
common law choice-of-law rules, the breach of the parent’s duty of care had occurred in their 
boardroom in England and held that the obligations of the parent towards the employees of 
the subsidiary and the people in the vicinity were to be determined under South African law.  
Although not made under Rome II, these decisions illustrate the likely answer to the question 
whether the decisions concerning the operations of the subsidiary taken by the parent in its 
home country are to be considered as the relevant event for the purposes of Article 7. 
Instead of framing their claims in terms of environmental damage, victims may claim 
for the alleged violation of their human rights.  Rome II does not have special choice-of-law 
rules for human rights claims.  The general choice-of-law rules of Article 4 would apply and 
point to the application of the law of the country of the direct damage.  Since the direct 
damage in the Lubbe v Cape type of case occurs in the subsidiary’s country, the law of that 
country will govern.  It is highly unlikely that that law will be displaced in favour of the law 
of the parent company’s home country under the escape clause of Article 4(3). 
In conclusion, regardless of how a claim for environmental damage in the Lubbe v 
Cape type of case is framed, the applicable law is almost certain to be the law of the country 
of the subsidiary, typically a developing country.  This law will typically contain relatively 
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lax environmental and compensation standards in comparison with the law of the parent 
company’s home country.  Consequently, even though victims of environmental damage are 
able to obtain the jurisdiction of the English courts over the parent established in that country, 
they will struggle to find lawyers willing to take on their case on ‘no win no fee’ basis. 
 
Conclusion 
This article examines whether, and to what extent, the rules of European private international 
law, which frame international litigation in the Member State courts, contribute to the 
regulation of the environment.  Contrary to the majority opinion, this article argues that these 
rules fail in their pursuit of the cosmopolitan goals of EU environmental policy.  They are 
therefore an inadequate tool of global governance. 
After outlining the regulatory potential of private international law with regard to the 
protection of the environment, this article observes that international environmental litigation 
in EU courts is effectively confined to two types of case.  In the first type private claimants 
sue an operator whose actions in one country directly cause environmental damage 
elsewhere.  In the second type of case the claim is brought by victims against a European-
based corporation operating in an extraction or chemical industry whose overseas subsidiary, 
typically in a developing country, causes environmental damage.  Proceedings are 
commenced by private claimants only, arguably because European private international law 
excludes from its scope claims by public authorities against foreign operators.  Claims by 
public authorities, however, are crucial in cases of pure environmental damage where no 
individual suffers actionable personal injury, property damage or economic loss or where 
such harm is thinly spread among a number of victims, as recognised by the Environmental 
Liability Directive.  The second type of case is limited to extraction and chemical industries 
65 
 
not just because of their characteristics and location but also because such industries tend to 
be run by hierarchical parent-subsidiary corporate groups.  Other industries tend to be run by 
corporate groups with more open and flexible forms of corporate organisation or business 
networks, where the chances of ascribing liability to the parent company/the controlling 
enterprise(s) are so low that arguably no lawyer will take on a case on a ‘no win no fee’ basis. 
The rules of European private international law also have the following regulatory 
effects.  By allowing the victim of environmental damage to choose both the forum and the 
applicable law between the courts/law of the country of the damage and the courts/law of the 
country of the event giving rise to the damage, the Brussels I Recast and Rome II address 
relatively adequately the first type of case.  But the cases of this type that are brought in EU 
courts will almost always concern actions committed in the EU and/or environmental damage 
suffered in the EU.  By guaranteeing the victim in this type of case the choice of the law of an 
EU Member State, Rome II helps to raise the level of environmental protection within the EU 
and at its borders.  Crucially, European private international law fails to deal with the 
globally more important and frequent cases of the second type.  The Brussels I Recast allows 
the claimants in this type of case to commence proceedings in the EU against a parent 
company domiciled here, although it gives an amount of discretion to the Member State 
courts to stay their proceedings when parallel or related proceedings are already pending in a 
third country.  The choice-of-law rules of Rome II, however, arguably lead to the application 
of the law of the country of the subsidiary, typically a developing country.  This law will 
typically contain laxer environmental and compensation standards in comparison with the 
law of the parent’s home country, which will make it hard for victims to obtain representation 
on a ‘no win no fee’ basis.  Importantly, claimants in this type of case in the English courts 
will be unable to invoke the type of liability recently established in the English law of torts in 
66 
 
Chandler v Cape.
218
  European private international law therefore effectively shields 
European multinational corporations from liability for the environmentally detrimental and 
degrading effects of their overseas operations. 
For these reasons, the rules of European private international law overall fail in their 
pursuit of the cosmopolitan goals of EU environmental policy.  In fact, they often lead to 
outcomes that are contrary to the universally accepted environmental law principles on which 
EU environmental policy is based such as the principles that environmental damage should as 
a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter pays. 
It is worrying to see similar developments occurring elsewhere.  In April 2013, for 
example, the US Supreme Court effectively barred victims of gross violations of human 
rights and the environment outside the US by foreign corporations from bringing ATCA 
claims.  A year earlier UK Parliament passed a bill overhauling the system of conditional fees 
to the detriment of claimants in international environmental litigations.  Under the new rules, 
the claimants’ lawyers can recover from the losing defendant only ‘proportionate’ (as 
opposed to ‘necessary’) legal costs and no success fees and litigation insurance premiums.219  
Coupled with the fact that, after the entry into force of Rome II, the assessment of damages is 
a matter for the law governing the tort,
220
 often the law of a developing country, it is likely 
that these developments will have a chilling effect on international environmental litigation in 
England.
221
  It should not be forgotten that the House of Lords in Lubbe v Cape
222
 and 
Connelly v RTZ
223
 regarded the shortcomings of the Namibian and South African legal 
systems which had a similar effect on international environmental and human rights litigation 
in these countries as leading to a denial of justice.  It is likely that the future of international 
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environmental litigation in England will depend on the willingness and ability of non-
governmental environmental organisations to bring and sustain this type of litigation, as is the 
case now in the Netherlands.
224
  The costs of such litigation, however, may turn out to be 
prohibitive. 
In order to achieve fully its regulatory potential, the rules of European private 
international should be improved.  The Brussels I Recast and Rome II should include within 
their scope claims by public authorities against foreign operators.  The rules of the Recast that 
allow the courts to stay their proceeding when parallel or related proceedings are already 
pending in a third country should be applied restrictively.  The victims of environmental 
damage in the second type of case should be allowed to choose the law of the country of the 
parent company.  Admittedly, there are scholars who believe that the rules of European 
private international are already along those lines.  After a detailed examination of these 
rules, however, this article concludes that the restrictive, non-environmental-friendly 
interpretation is much more likely.  It is for this reason that the Brussels I Recast and Rome II 
should be amended to expressly include within their scope claims by public authorities 
against foreign operators
225
 and to expressly allow the victim to choose the law of the 
parent’s country.  On their own, however, these improvements will not be enough.  They 
should be complemented with adequate rules on the funding of international environmental 
litigation and liability of parent companies in corporate groups and dominant enterprise(s) in 
business networks for environmental damage caused by their subsidiaries, affiliates and 
cooperating enterprises.  At one point, it seemed that English law would move in this 
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direction.  However, the proposed Corporate Responsibility Bill 2003 introduced in the 
House of Commons never made it through to the second reading.
226
  The time is ripe for these 
issues to be taken up by the EU legislator. 
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